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Abstract
In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of
the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers’ ra-
tionality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the dis-
agreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies—in
particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the
Conciliatory View—are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of
the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Stead-
fast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in
some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the
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Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic
perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has
not been exhausted by the present paper.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to show that the problem of peer disagreement can be
analyzed from a game-theoretic perspective. The problem of peer disagree-
ment, as it is presented in the literature (e.g., Kelly 2005, 167; Christensen
2009, 756; Elga 2007, 478; Feldman 2007, 201), is how to respond rationally
to the disagreement from an epistemic peer, whereby epistemic peer is con-
strued as an agent who has the same evidence and is comparably good at
evaluating that evidence (Kelly 2005, 170; Christensen 2007, 188; Feldman
2007, 201; Lackey 2008, 274). Game theory, in turn, is the study of strategic
decision making, where ‘strategic’ means that the decision of one decision
maker may interact with that of another. This paper explains how the latter
can be used to analyze the former.
To do so, we focus on two prominent strategies recommended in the
literature about peer disagreement, namely the response advocated by the
Conciliatory View and the one suggested by the Steadfast View.1 On the
Conciliatory View, it can not be rational for an agent to stick to her opinion
when it is disputed by an epistemic peer. Instead, she should suspend judg-
ment (Feldman 2007), split the difference (Elga 2007), or at least migrate
her opinion significantly in the direction of her peer’s conflicting opinion
(Christensen 2007). In this paper we focus on full belief states rather than
degrees of belief, so that the subtle differences between these ‘Conciliatory
Views’ can be dispensed with. According to the Steadfast View, on the other
hand, it can be rational for an agent to retain her opinion in the face of peer
1In the debate about peer disagreement, it is common to talk about ‘responses’, whereas
in the context of game theory ‘strategies’ is conventional. In this paper, we will use the
two terms interchangeably.
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disagreement (Kelly 2005, van Inwagen 2010).
The game-theoretic toolkit enables us to analyze the rationality of these
responses (strategies) for disagreeing peers (players), relative to these peers’
epistemic goals (preferences). In the literature on peer disagreement, the
epistemic goal is commonly understood to be believing the correct truth-value
of the proposition under discussion (Christensen 2007, 216; Feldman 2007,
212; Elga 2007, 488; Kelly 2010, 17; and, even if only indirectly, White 2005,
450). Thus, the rationality of the available responses—i.e., the Conciliatory
strategy and the Steadfast strategy—can be analyzed by investigating to
what extent they satisfy the preferences (epistemic goals) of the disagreeing
peers. In section 2 we argue that existing formal approaches do not address
this particular question. In sections 3 and 4 we explain the details of our
approach to the problem of peer disagreement. Section 5 discusses the results
of this model, section 6 considers some possible extensions or variations of
the model, and section 7 wraps up by emphasizing some key take-aways.
2 Why a Game-Theoretic Approach?
Why should a game-theoretic analysis be a relevant contribution to the de-
bate about peer disagreement? Our motivation is that the resources of game
theory enable a clarification of the responses to peer disagreement—in par-
ticular, of the Conciliatory View and the Steadfast View—along an inde-
pendently motivated and well-developed standard. In the debate about peer
disagreement, it is not always clear how exactly rationality is understood,
what exactly counts as a peer, what a disagreement is, or even what ex-
actly the Conciliatory View and the Steadfast View amount to (cf. Jehle and
Fitelson 2009, Moss 2011, Lasonen-Aarnio 2013).
A formalization along the lines of game theory forces us to be precise
about these notions. And the fruit of such explicitness is that it helps us
to gain a better understanding of the conditions under which a particular
strategy (like the ones suggested by the Conciliatory View and the Steadfast
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View) can be considered a rational response to the disagreement from a peer.
We do not want to suggest that our game-theoretic model is the only way
to make the machinery under the problem of peer disagreement formally
precise. Here we consider some previous work along these lines.
First it is important to distinguish quantitative and qualitative cases of
peer disagreement. In the quantitative case the agents assign different degrees
of belief to a proposition, whereas the qualitative case concerns full belief
states (belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment). Some have argued
that the quantitative model of epistemic agents should be taken as basic and
the qualitative model should be reduced to it (Lin and Kelly 2012, Leitgeb
2014). Others have argued the reverse (Easwaran forthcoming). This debate
remains unresolved. As a result, we can treat quantitative and qualitative
cases of peer disagreement as separate problems. Our focus in this paper is on
the qualitative case. But as the majority of the work in formal epistemology
that is potentially relevant to peer disagreement focuses on the quantitative
case, we discuss this work first.
There are two dominant models in the literature on revising degrees of
belief in light of new information (here, the information that an epistemic
peer assigns different degrees of belief). One is the (iterated) linear pooling
model developed by French (1956), DeGroot (1974) and Lehrer and Wagner
(1981). In this model, the revised degrees of belief are obtained by taking
a weighted average of the agents’ opinions. This is consistent with both
the Steadfast View and the Conciliatory View. The Steadfast View says
an agent can rationally give weight one to her own opinion and zero to her
peer’s, whereas the Conciliatory View says this is not rationally permissible.2
However, it is not clear what gives linear pooling its normative force.
Without an interpretation of the weights used, “it is not clear why we should
change our beliefs according to the weighted linear average, instead of, for
2On this explication of the views French and DeGroot are proponents of the Steadfast
View, and Lehrer and Wagner are proponents of the Conciliatory View. However, Lehrer
and Wagner would not endorse stronger interpretations of the Conciliatory View, e.g.,
that giving equal weight to each agent’s opinion is required (cf. Jehle and Fitelson 2009).
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instance, the weighted geometric average” (Martini et al. 2013, 887).
Romeijn (2015) attempts to give such an interpretation. He shows that if
the agents’ priors take a particular form, linear pooling can be construed as
a special case of Bayesian conditionalization (the other dominant model for
revising degrees of belief), where the weights assigned to agents are identified
with the truth-conduciveness of those agents. On this construal, linear pool-
ing inherits the normative force that Bayesian conditionalization is generally
taken to have, although particular assumptions need to be in place in order
for linear pooling to be sanctioned by the Bayesian model.
Two problems remain. First, there appears to be no normative reason for
the agents’ priors to take the required form. Second, it does not settle the
debate between the Steadfast and the Conciliatory View, as the formalism
itself does not settle whether an agent is rationally permitted to give weight
one to her own opinion.
The first problem can be circumvented by allowing the agents to have any
priors, taking Bayesian conditionalization as the normative model for revising
degrees of belief without requiring that it agrees with linear pooling. Under
certain assumptions, the agents can be guaranteed to reach a consensus in
this model (Aumann 1976, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1982). But the
second problem remains.3
It appears, then, that none of the extant work in formal epistemology
yields a view on the quantitative case of peer disagreement, although a fo-
cused discussion of the relations between the models we discussed and peer
disagreement may still yield valuable insight. While we offer no view on
3Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982, 197) show that one of the agents’ opinion
may never change despite the presence of disagreement. This suggests that sticking to
one’s opinion is (sometimes) rationally permissible, in support of the Steadfast View.
But this argument works only if one assumes that Bayesian conditionalization is the only
requirement of diachronic rationality, since further requirements of rationality may rule
out these cases. Moreover, the kind of cases considered by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
arguably do not count as cases of peer disagreement strictly speaking, as the agents have
different evidence concerning the proposition they disagree about.
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the quantitative case here, the model we present could relatively easily be
adapted to it.
In addition to the problems mentioned above, linear pooling and Bayesian
conditionalization offer no solution to the qualitative case of peer disagree-
ment, which will be our focus from here on out. For the qualitative case
there are again two dominant classes of relevant formal models. The first
is known as belief revision, usually (but not necessarily) using the so-called
AGM model (Alchourrón et al. 1985). This model has been applied to peer
disagreement (Cevolani 2014, Elkin 2015). While these papers are interest-
ing, they beg the question in favor of the Conciliatory View: they explore
ways in which a Conciliatory response to peer disagreement affects an agent’s
other beliefs.
A similar problem holds for the second class of models, those based on
judgment aggregation. Regardless of whether one follows the dominant ax-
iomatic approach (List and Pettit 2002, List 2013) or focuses more directly
on the reliability of aggregation methods (Hartmann et al. 2010, Hartmann
and Sprenger 2012), these models already assume that one has decided to
form a consensus opinion. Again, the Steadfast View is ruled out by the
formal setup without argument.
It is also worth noting that most models of judgment aggregation and
voting theory more generally concentrate on the case of at least three agents,
whereas we, following the peer disagreement literature, focus on the case
of two agents. Most of the prominent aggregation methods rely on some
variation of majority voting, which does not yield very interesting results in
the case of two disagreeing agents. We briefly return to the case of more
than two agents in section 6.
The model of the present paper addresses the peer disagreement debate
head on, as we give a direct comparison of the Conciliatory and the Stead-
fast View. While some previous work has aimed to make ideas from the peer
disagreement literature formally precise (Jehle and Fitelson 2009, Cevolani
2014, Elkin 2015), we are not aware of any formal work that makes this kind
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of direct comparison.4 Some of the work mentioned above could perhaps be
adapted to make such a comparison, which we think would be very interest-
ing. But in the remainder of this paper we aim to argue (1) that the specific
game-theoretic model we provide captures one interesting way to make the
ideas underlying the peer disagreement debate more precise, and (2) that the
model is flexible enough that it can be straightforwardly adapted to capture
other ways of making these ideas more precise.
3 The Peer Disagreement Game
We introduce our game-theoretic setup with the help of an informal example.
Imagine two detectives, call them Jane (Marple) and Hercule (Poirot), who
both have been asked to go to a crime scene to investigate whether φ, say,
whether the butler is the culprit. We make the following three assumptions
about the detectives. First, they have the same evidence at their disposal to
investigate φ, namely whatever traces are left at the crime scene. Second, the
detectives can make an informed estimation of how reliable each of them is in
investigating φ, based on their respective track-records; the number of crimes
they have solved in the past compared to the number of crimes they did not
solve. Third, the detectives really want to find out the truth regarding φ,
they really want to solve the case.
We take it that the fulfillment of these three conditions is what is (at
minimum) required for the two detectives to be called each other’s peers,
considering the construals of peerhood by, for example, Kelly (2005, 175),
Elga (2007, 484), Lackey (2008, 274), and Christensen (2009, 757). The
attribution of peerhood then depends on how equal the detectives must be
in their reliability. Our analysis accommodates this.
4Except perhaps Lehrer and Wagner (1981), as they argue for normative claims which
entail that agents should give positive weight to their peers. This is effectively an argument
for the Conciliatory View in the quantitative case (at least on liberal interpretations of
that view, see footnote 2). But note the criticism by Martini et al. (2013) mentioned
above.
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Jane and Hercule both go to the crime scene, and spend some time exam-
ining and evaluating the evidence. After some time, they meet up to report
their findings.
Two things can happen at this point. Jane and Hercule have either formed
the same belief about φ, or they have formed conflicting beliefs and disagree
about φ. In the model, these beliefs are generated probabilistically (see the
next section).
If the detectives have reached the same conclusion about φ, say, they
agree that the butler is indeed the culprit, then there is no problem of peer
disagreement. The detectives can go write their reports. The case that
we are interested in is when the detectives have formed conflicting opinions
regarding φ; for example, when Jane believes that the butler is the culprit
and Hercule believes that the butler is innocent. And our question is what,
in such a case, a rational response for Jane and Hercule can be, given their
goal of finding out the truth about φ, and the information they have about
each other’s track-records.
Based on the debate about peer disagreement, we distinguish three strate-
gies that the detectives can choose. The first comes from the Steadfast View
and is the strategy of staying with the initial belief. We call this strategy
Stay. The second strategy is the Conciliatory View’s recommendation to
suspend judgment.5 This strategy is called Suspend. And third, for the sake
of completeness, we include switching to the belief of the other detective as
a third possible strategy, called Switch.
After Jane and Hercule find out that they disagree about whether the
butler is the culprit, they each play one of these three strategies. When Jane
plays Suspend, she withdraws her initial belief about φ, goes back to the
crime scene to re-examine the evidence, and forms a new belief about φ. But
when Jane plays Stay, she chooses to ignore the disagreement and maintains
5Technically, the recommendation from the Conciliatory View can also be to split the
difference with one’s peer (Elga 2007), or to revise one’s initial confidence level in the
proposition considerably (Christensen 2007). But since we restrict ourselves to full beliefs,
we take it that the Conciliatory View’s recommendation amounts to suspending judgment.
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her initial opinion. And when Jane plays Switch, she chooses to ignore her
own opinion and takes over the belief of Hercule.
So only when a detective plays Suspend she gets a chance to form a new
opinion. It might be objected that acquiring a new belief is not a necessary
consequence of suspending judgment. We agree. We should distinguish be-
tween two ways in which judgment can be suspended. The first is to suspend
judgment indefinitely, or at least until new evidence comes in, because there
is at present not enough evidence to form a rational belief. The second is to
suspend judgment only momentarily, as an act of caution in light of unex-
pected counterevidence, but after which a new belief may be formed through
a re-examination of the evidence. Such a momentary suspension of judg-
ment is justified for cases in which a Peircean ‘irritation of doubt’ needs to
be resolved, because it is unsatisfactory or unwarranted not to have a belief
about the matter. We take it that this is the preferred form of suspension
of judgment in the well-known restaurant case of Christensen (2007, 193), in
which two peers disagree about the division of the bill, as well as in other
influential examples of peer disagreement (e.g. Feldman 2007, 208–209). In
this paper we also work with this short-term interpretation of suspension of
judgment. A long-term interpretation would be a welcome extension of our
analysis (see section 6 and appendix B).
The disagreement game ends when the two detectives reach an agreement
about φ. For example, suppose Jane believes that the butler did it, and
Hercule believes that he did not do it, and Jane plays Suspend and Hercule
plays Stay. Then the game ends when, after re-examining the evidence, Jane
draws the same conclusion as Hercule, namely that the butler is innocent.6
The same would happen when, for example, Jane plays Stay and Hercule
plays Switch. But the game continues when, after one or both of them
re-examine the evidence, the two detectives still disagree about φ.
6Since Hercule plays Stay, he never changes his belief. So the game ends when Jane
concedes. As we explain in more detail in section 4, our probabilistic model for generating
new beliefs guarantees that this will happen eventually when she plays Suspend.
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For the purposes of this paper, we assume that the detectives do not
change strategies throughout the disagreement game.7 This means that the
game might also continue forever. For example, when Jane believes that the
butler is innocent and Hercule disagrees, and both detectives play Stay, then
they will never come to an agreement. The same thing happens when both
detectives play Switch.8
And now we are in a position to analyze how well these strategies do in
guiding each detective to the correct verdict on whether the butler did it.
Which of these strategies gives a detective the best prospects of arriving at
the truth?
Observe that which strategy is best will depend on two factors.9 First, it
depends on the reliability (i.e., the track-record) of each of the two detectives.
For example, if Jane thinks that Hercule is better at evaluating correctly
whether the butler did it, then it would be ill-advised for her to play Stay
upon finding out that Hercule disagrees with her initial assessment. But
when Jane thinks that she is more reliable than Hercule, then playing Stay
may be sensible.
Second, which strategy is best depends also on the strategy of the other
detective. For example, when Hercule plays Stay, it does not really matter
for Jane whether she plays Suspend or Switch, because either way the game
7The reason is that this allows a straightforward comparison of the Conciliatory View,
which recommends playing Suspend for all instances of peer disagreement, and the Stead-
fast View, according to which playing Stay can be rational. It would be an interesting
extension of our model to allow players to change their strategy during the game (see
section 6).
8That under these strategies the game continues forever does not make an evaluation
of the rationality of these strategies impossible. For in both cases we can still evaluate
how well these strategies do with respect to tracking the truth.
9It should be noted that on our approach the rationality of a strategy does not depend
in any way on ‘right reasoning’ at the first stage, during the initial assessment of the
evidence, like it does in Kelly (2005, 2010). Our approach is more akin to Christensen
(2007) or Elga (2007), where a rational strategy is to be determined independent of one’s
initial reasoning behind the disputed belief.
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will end when Jane takes over the conclusion of Hercule. But when Hercule
plays Switch, it does matter whether Jane plays Suspend or Switch, because
playing Switch will bring them in a state of perpetual disagreement, whereas
playing Suspend will make them agree eventually (due to the probabilistic
way in which new beliefs are generated; see the next section). We will return
to these points in section 5.
This concludes our informal description of the peer disagreement game.
In the next section we will provide the formal vocabulary, and then analyze
this game.
4 Rationality for Jane and Hercule
Whenever Jane and Hercule investigate the evidence, they may conclude that
the butler did it (φ) or that he did not do it (¬φ). One of these conclusions
is true and one is false.
We will denote by p and q the reliability or truth-sensitivity of Jane and
Hercule, respectively. Thus p is the probability, on any given investigation,
that Jane draws a true conclusion from the evidence. 1 − p denotes the
probability of a false belief. So if the butler really did it Jane believes that he
did it with probability p and believes in his innocence with probability 1−p.
Whereas if he is innocent she believes in his innocence with probability p
and believes that he did it with probability 1− p. Hercule’s probabilities of
drawing a true or a false conclusion from the evidence are denoted by q and
1− q, respectively.
We choose to model the probability of generating a true or false belief
rather than the probability of generating a belief for or against φ because
we have evidence for the former but not the latter based on the respective
track-records of the two detectives. We assumed at the start of section 3 that
this track-record information is known to the two detectives.
To avoid trivial cases, we assume that 0 < p < 1 and 0 < q < 1. We
further assume that, if Jane or Hercule suspends judgment in response to
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disagreement, their new opinion is generated with the same probabilities
as their initial opinion (so Jane believes correctly with probability p, and
Hercule believes correctly with probability q). We also assume that each
time an opinion is generated this is done independently (in the probabilistic
sense) from the detective’s previous opinions and the other detective’s current
or previous opinions.
We think the assumption that the detectives reason independently from
each other is justified because they make their assessments separately. If
they are likely to come to the same conclusion this must be because the
evidence points in a particular direction, which is reflected in the model by
the choice of p and q.10 On the other hand, the assumption that newly
generated opinions are independent from previously generated ones may be
unrealistic, but it turns out not to have a strong influence on the results (see
section 6 and appendix A).
In the epistemology of peer disagreement—as we learn from, for example,
Christensen (2007, 216), Feldman (2007, 212), Elga (2007, 488), and Kelly
(2010, 17)—the objective of rational conduct is commonly understood to be
believing the correct truth-value. This suggests the following epistemic norm.
Accuracy Norm (AN). Having a true belief is more valuable than having
a false belief.
We assume that Jane and Hercule share this noble goal, and that in fact
obtaining a true belief about whether the butler did it is their only goal.11
So the two detectives are not distracted by pragmatic concerns. This is a
methodological rather than a substantive assumption: we are interested in
the epistemology of peer disagreement, not its pragmatics.
10Note that p and q reflect the detectives’ probabilities of reasoning correctly given the
evidence, but not the probability of certain evidence being present; its presence or absence
is taken as given for our purposes.
11We recognize that one might have other epistemic goals than truth. In section 5 we
show that some of these goals can be seen to follow from (AN). In section 6 we discuss
the possibility of explicitly adding other norms.
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(AN) determines the detectives’ preferences over outcomes of the dis-
agreement game: Jane prefers an outcome in which she has a true belief
about the butler’s guilt over one in which she has a false belief, and likewise
for Hercule.12 A detective receives utility 1 if her belief about the guilt or
innocence of the butler at the end of the disagreement game is true, and
utility 0 if it is false.13
The expected utility of a detective in the game is then simply the prob-
ability of ending the game with a true belief. So Jane and Hercule prefer
a strategy if it increases their probability of ending the disagreement game
with a true belief concerning φ.
We can now determine the probabilities of ending the disagreement game
with a true belief for each combination of strategies of the two detectives (a
combination of strategies is called a strategy profile).
If both detectives play Stay, they never change their mind in response
to disagreement, so their probability of ending with a true belief is simply
the probability that they obtain a true belief initially: p for Jane and q for
Hercule. In all other cases the probability of ending the disagreement game
with a true belief is the same for both detectives. These probabilities are
indicated in table 1. The rows of table 1 indicate Jane’s choice of strategy,
and the columns indicate Hercule’s choice.14
12Note that under our interpretation of (AN) detectives care only about the truth of
their own belief. Results concerning a variation of our model where the detectives also
care about the truth of the other detective’s belief are available from the authors upon
request.
13The introduction of utilities here adds nothing over and above the informal statement
in the previous sentence. In particular the numbers 0 and 1 are arbitrary: all that matters
is that a true belief yields a higher utility.
14This completes our specification of the game. Formally, a game is a triple
(N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ), where N is the set of players, Si the set of strategies available
to player i, and ui the utility function for player i, which assigns real-valued utility to
each strategy profile. In our case there are two players: N = {Jane, Hercule}; the strat-
egy sets for both players are identical: SJane = SHercule = {Stay, Suspend, Switch}; and
the utility for each player on each strategy profile is as in table 1.
The utilities are determined using the description of the disagreement game given in
13
Stay Suspend Switch
Stay (p, q) p p
Suspend q pq
pq+(1−p)(1−q)
p(1−(1−p)(1−q))
1−p(1−p)
Switch q q(1−(1−p)(1−q))1−q(1−q) pq
Table 1: Expected utilities associated with each strategy profile under (AN).
How can the detectives maximize their probability of ending the disagree-
ment game with a true belief, given that the choice of strategy of the other
detective influences their probability of attaining true belief, but they cannot
control it? Game theorists have invented various concepts of rationality in a
game to deal with this problem. We will use the notion of Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium is a profile—that is, an assignment of a strategy to
each player—in which either player’s strategy is a best response to the other’s.
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium, no player can get an outcome she
prefers over the equilibrium outcome by unilaterally changing her strategy.
In our game this means that in a Nash equilibrium Jane and Hercule are
maximizing their respective probabilities of ending the game with a true
belief, given (that is, keeping fixed) the other detective’s strategy. This is
how we interpret (epistemic) rationality for Jane and Hercule.
section 3. For example, if both detectives play Suspend they will generate new beliefs
repeatedly until the first time they agree. The probability that they both generate a belief
that φ is true is pq and the probability that they agree that φ is false is (1 − p)(1 − q).
So the probability that they end the game with a correct belief about φ is the probability
that, on the first round on which they agree, they agree that φ is true rather than that φ
is false. This probability is simply pq divided by pq+ (1− p)(1− q). See also appendix A.
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5 Results and Discussion
What are the Nash equilibria of this game?15 This turns out to depend on the
values of p and q. Figure 1 shows which strategy profiles are Nash equilibria
for any combination of values of p and q.
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Stay,Switch)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Stay)
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Suspend,Switch)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Suspend)
(Switch,Suspend)
(Suspend,Switch)
(Suspend,Suspend)
(Stay,Stay)
0
1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
Figure 1: Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game as a function of the
truth-sensitivity of the detectives. E.g., if p = 0.4 and q = 0.9 then the Nash
equilibria of the game are (Suspend,Stay) and (Switch,Suspend).
Recall that we noted in section 3 that two factors would influence which
strategy choice is best. First, the truth-sensitivity of the two detectives
(modeled as p and q) and second, the strategy of the other detective. Both
of these factors are shown in our results in figure 1.
15We consider only pure strategy equilibria.
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The truth-sensitivity of the detectives clearly influences which strategy
profiles are rational. For example, (Stay,Switch) is a Nash equilibrium when-
ever Hercule’s truth-sensitivity (his probability of drawing a true conclusion)
is less than Jane’s truth-sensitivity and less than Jane’s probability of draw-
ing a false conclusion (formally, q ≤ min{p, 1−p}). Similarly, (Switch,Stay)
is a Nash equilibrium whenever Hercule’s truth-sensitivity is between Jane’s
truth-sensitivity and Jane’s probability of drawing a false conclusion (for-
mally, p ≤ q ≤ 1− p).
The other detective’s strategy also influences what it is rational for a
detective to do. For example, if Hercule’s truth-sensitivity is higher than
Jane’s probability of drawing a false conclusion, but less than 1/2 (for-
mally, 1 − p ≤ q ≤ 1/2), the Nash equilibria are (Stay,Suspend) and
(Suspend,Switch). So under these circumstances, if Hercule chooses the
strategy Suspend, it is rational for Jane to choose Stay, while if Hercule
chooses Switch, it is rational for Jane to choose Suspend.
The epistemic success of the two detectives (both in terms of which strat-
egy promises the best probability of a true belief, and in terms of the value
of that probability) thus depends on the choices made by the other detective.
In this way the epistemology of this model is truly social.
One way to understand the results in figure 1 is to view the detectives as
making a tradeoff between two competing risks. On the one hand, there is
the ‘cost’ of giving up one’s initial opinion. On the other hand, there is the
cost of ignoring the other detective. When one detective has a significantly
better track-record than the other (as reflected in the values of p and q),
it is too costly for that detective to give up her initial opinion and switch
to the other’s opinion. She gains more by staying with the initial belief, or
suspending judgment and acquiring a new belief.
For the other detective it is the other way around. In her case, it is too
costly to ignore the opinion of the other detective. Since she does not have as
good a track-record, she would not gain as much by staying with her initial
belief, or suspending judgment and acquiring a new belief, as she will by
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switching to the opinion of the other detective. For her the cost of ignoring
the other detective is higher than the cost of giving up her original opinion.
The tipping points in these game-theoretic transactions can be read off from
figure 1.
It is worth pointing out that the detectives’ desire to minimize these
risks is not epistemically basic. We have assumed that the only thing the
detectives (ultimately) care about is maximizing their probability of ending
the peer disagreement game with a true belief about φ. We now see that this
goal, as formalized in (AN), implies that the detectives should worry about
these two risks, and gives the detectives an epistemically motivated basis
for trading them off against one another. In this sense our results fit nicely
with the emerging literature that aims to explain various epistemic norms as
following from (AN) (Joyce 1998, Pettigrew 2013).
Of particular interest in evaluating the results in figure 1 are the profiles
(Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend). This is because the former captures
most directly the Steadfast View—according to which it can be rational to
Stay in a case of peer disagreement—and the latter captures most directly
the Conciliatory View—according to which the only rational option is to
Suspend.
What is surprising, and running contra the peer disagreement literature,
is that both (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) turn out to constitute Nash
equilibria, under some conditions even both at once.
As we can see from figure 1, the Steadfast profile (Stay,Stay) is a Nash
equilibrium when Jane and Hercule are each other’s equals in terms of how
truth-sensitive their beliefs are (i.e., p = q). In such a case neither would
gain anything by playing Suspend or Switch (provided the other detective
continues to play Stay). This is because the probability that a detective ends
up with a true belief by staying with her initial opinion is just as high as
the probability that the opinion of the other detective or a newly generated
opinion is true.
However, a mutual Conciliatory approach, as expressed in the strategy
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profile (Suspend,Suspend), can also be a Nash equilibrium. This happens
when p and q are both greater than 1/2 and are relatively close to each other
(see figure 1).16 When both detectives have relatively good track-records, and
they find out that they have formed conflicting beliefs, they stand to gain
more when they both suspend judgment and acquire a new belief, than when
they stick to their initial beliefs, or switch to the other detective’s belief.
An especially interesting scenario occurs whenever p and q are exactly
equal and greater than 1/2: then (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) are
Nash equilibria at the same time. Under the definition of rationality we use,
in such a case both Steadfast and Conciliatory strategies are rational.
We wish to stress the significance of this result. In the literature on peer
disagreement, the Steadfast strategy and the Conciliatory strategy are typi-
cally presented as mutually exclusive; either it is rational to play Stay or it
is rational to play Suspend, but they cannot both be rational. A surprising
insight of our analysis is that this need not be accurate. Under certain con-
ditions, namely when two agents are positively and equally reliable, both the
Steadfast strategy and the Conciliatory strategy can be rational. Moreover,
the case where the two agents are positively and equally reliable is exactly
the case the peer disagreement literature has focused on.
So where does this leave us in the peer disagreement debate? If we take
seriously the modalities in the definitions of the views, the Steadfast View
‘wins’: it can be rational to stick to one’s opinion in the face of peer disagree-
ment; the Conciliatory View’s claim that this cannot be rational is false in
our model. But if we take the views as recommending strategies (Stay for the
Steadfast View and Suspend for the Conciliatory View) then we think the
Conciliatory View has the advantage—even when both are Nash equilibria—
for the following reasons.
First, whenever (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) are Nash equilibria
16More precisely, the region where (Suspend,Suspend) is a Nash equilibrium is char-
acterized by the inequality p−
√
p(1−p)
2p−1 ≤ q ≤ p
2
1−2p(1−p) (although the first expression is
undefined when p = 1/2, the point p = q = 1/2 is also part of this region).
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simultaneously, (Suspend,Suspend) offers a higher utility (a higher probabil-
ity of solving the case correctly) to both detectives.17 In fact, (Suspend,Suspend)
is Pareto efficient. So Jane and Hercule prefer to play (Suspend,Suspend)
over (Stay,Stay). If they are allowed to discuss their strategy before the
game starts, we should expect both detectives to play Suspend.
Second, Suspend is a weakly dominant strategy (for both detectives),
while Stay is not. This means that playing Suspend pays off at least as well
as playing Stay or Switch, regardless of what strategy the other detective
chooses. So in this situation, playing Stay is only best for a detective who is
absolutely certain that the other detective is playing Stay as well (and even
then playing Suspend is equally good), whereas if there is only the slightest
uncertainty about what the other detective is going to do, Suspend is the
uniquely best strategy.
Third, we can see in figure 1 that when p and q are both greater than 1/2
there is a significant area in which the profile (Suspend,Suspend) is a Nash
equilibrium, while (Stay,Stay) is a Nash equilibrium only when p and q are
exactly equal.18 This means that the strategy Suspend has a larger margin
for error than the strategy Stay. If Jane and Hercule lack precise information
about each other’s truth-sensitivity (as is reasonable to expect), playing Stay
is ‘riskier’ than playing Suspend because the former requires exact and the
latter only approximate equality of the detectives’ truth-sensitivities.
To sum up, a surprising result of this model is that if the detectives
have equal track-records, and these track-records are ‘good’ (better than
chance), then both the Steadfast profile and the Conciliatory profile are Nash
equilibria. However, we have noted three reasons to think that in such cases
the Conciliatory strategy should be preferred.
17Whenever p = q > 1/2, it must also be the case that p
2
p2+(1−p)2 > p.
18More formally, the area where (Stay,Stay) is an equilibrium is measure zero in the
parameter space, whereas the area where (Suspend,Suspend) is an equilibrium has positive
measure.
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6 Limitations and Extensions of Our Analy-
sis
We have limited our analysis to a particular game-theoretic formalization of
a particular disagreement game between two detectives, Jane and Hercule.
To what extent does our analysis generalize to other peer disagreements?
And what variations or extensions of our formalization are possible?
Regarding the first question, our analysis applies to peer disagreements in
general insofar as they satisfy the assumptions of our model. In particular, (1)
peers are cashed out in terms of comparable reliability or truth-sensitivity, (2)
the possible responses available to the peers are something like the strategies
Stay, Suspend, and Switch as we model them, and (3) the rationality of a
particular response is evaluated in terms of how well it tracks the truth.
Regarding the second question, there are many options for different peer
disagreement games. Let us give eight variables that can be filled in differ-
ently.
First, doxastic attitudes: in our model, strategies act on full belief states,
but strategies might also be interpreted as adjusting degrees of belief.
Second, we forced our detectives to generate a new belief whenever they
suspend judgment on φ. A variation of our model might allow peers to
persist in a state of suspension. This outcome could be assigned its own
value, presumably worse than having a true belief but better than having a
false belief. We consider this variation in appendix B. Unsurprisingly, the
results depend on what epistemic value is assigned to the state of suspension.
Third, we assumed that whenever Jane or Hercule generates a new belief
(i.e., at the end of a round on which they disagreed and the relevant detective
is playing Suspend) the new belief generated is probabilistically independent
of the belief held on the previous round. This may seem unrealistic. For
example, Jane may generally be a reliable detective (p > 1/2) but she may
be prone to repeat mistakes in her reasoning. In appendix A we consider a
version of the model in which newly generated beliefs are positively correlated
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with the belief held on the previous round. The results are qualitatively
similar to those of section 5.
Fourth, the number of peers. What happens if there are more than two
disagreeing peers? Consider the case that we focused on above, where the
peers’ truth-sensitivity is equal, and greater than 1/2. The Condorcet Jury
Theorem shows that if a moderately large number of peers simultaneously
state their opinion, the majority opinion is highly likely to be correct.19 But
models of informational cascades show that if the peers state their opinion
sequentially, the majority outcome is not nearly so informative (Bikhchan-
dani et al. 1992, 996–999). This illustrates once again that the success of
epistemic strategies—here majority voting, a plausible generalization of the
Conciliatory View—can be quite sensitive to subtle contextual details, which
formal models can focus attention on.
Fifth, we kept the peers’ strategies fixed throughout the game. The rea-
son for this was to enable an evaluation of the Conciliatory and Steadfast
strategies. But it would be an interesting extension of the game to allow
peers to change their strategies during the game.
Sixth, we assumed that the game might go on indefinitely. This is not
very realistic. In real life there are time and energy constraints. So another
possible extension would be to let the game continue for a limited number of
rounds, after which the agents must have made up their minds. We consider
the case with only one round in appendix B. If the other assumptions are
unchanged, the results favor the Conciliatory View slightly more than those
of the main text (see figure 3 in appendix B).
Seventh, in our analysis the rationality of a strategy was evaluated using
Nash equilibria. Although this is very natural in game theory, it has sub-
stantive normative implications. So one may want to consider alternatives.
Available alternatives include various refinements of the notion of equilib-
rium, such as the trembling hand equilibrium, and alternative standards,
19See List and Goodin (2001) for philosophical discussion and generalizations of the
theorem.
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such as weak dominance. Different strategies may turn out to be rational
under such different standards of rationality.
Finally, we worked with only one epistemic norm, namely accuracy. But
there are more epistemic goals. For example, many philosophers of science
have argued, under the label of ‘epistemic diversity’, that maintaining diver-
sity of opinion can have epistemic value to a population of scientists, stim-
ulating new ideas and discoveries (Feyerabend 1975, Kitcher 1990, Zollman
2010). And the literature on epistemic rationality has identified a trade-off
between truth and information (Levi 1967). For example, true beliefs could
be maximized by believing only tautologies, but this is not informative. Ei-
ther of these considerations could motivate augmenting or replacing (AN)
with different norms.
7 Conclusion
By way of conclusion we emphasize four lessons that can be drawn from
our preliminary game-theoretic investigation of the epistemology of peer dis-
agreement.
First, in our model the Steadfast and Conciliatory strategies were some-
times both right: there were circumstances in which both staying with your
own opinion and suspending belief were rational. The idea that staying and
suspending can be rational simultaneously is underexplored in the literature
and worth investigating more extensively.
Second, the rationality of a response to peer disagreement may depend on
the truth-sensitivity of the peers. Both the peers’ relative truth-sensitivity
(who has a better track-record and by how much?) and their absolute truth-
sensitivity (are they better than chance, say, or some other objective thresh-
old?) can make a difference.
Third, what is rational for a peer to do (e.g., whether to be Steadfast or
Conciliatory) may depend on what the other peer is doing. This is a natural
conclusion to draw in the game-theoretic context, but underexplored in the
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peer disagreement literature.
Fourth, analysis of other game-theoretic models of peer disagreement may
shed more light on the above three points and other important questions
about peer disagreement. We encourage anyone interested in our model
(especially if they liked it but for one or two assumptions) to develop and
analyze such an alternative game-theoretic model of peer disagreement. We
hope to have provided a fruitful framework within with such further models
can be developed.
A A Model With Correlated Beliefs
In the main text we made a number of assumptions, some of which it might
be desirable to relax or drop. In these appendices we consider a few slightly
different versions of the model. In appendix A we relax the assumption
that, when a detective plays Suspend, the new beliefs generated when a
disagreement occurs are probabilistically independent of those generated on
the previous round. In appendix B, we consider a non-iterative version of the
game (i.e., the detectives’ beliefs are evaluated at the end of the first round,
rather than after a potentially lengthy exchange).
A.1 The Model
In the main text we assumed that whenever Jane or Hercule generates a new
belief (i.e., at the end of a round on which they disagreed and the relevant
detective is playing Suspend) the new belief generated is probabilistically
independent of the belief held on the previous round. This may seem unreal-
istic. For example, Jane may generally be a reliable detective (p > 1/2) but
she may be prone to repeat mistakes in her reasoning.
Here is a way to generalize the model to account for this possibility,
while retaining the detectives’ truth-sensitivity as a parameter of the model.
Whenever a new belief needs to be generated (on a round other than the first),
Jane retains the belief she had on the previous round with probability 1− δ,
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and she only generates a new belief with probability δ. If she generates a
new belief, the new belief is true with probability p and false with probability
1− p.20
As a result, Jane’s newly generated opinion is positively correlated with
her opinion on the previous round, with lower values of δ corresponding to
higher degrees of correlation. Similarly for Hercule: he keeps the belief he
had on the previous round with probability 1− ε, and if he does generate a
new belief it is true with probability q.
When δ = ε = 1 this model reduces to the model of the main text in which
newly generated beliefs are probabilistically independent of previous ones.
Lower values of δ and ε correspond to higher degrees of correlation between
old and new beliefs. Any level of (positive) correlation can be generated
within this model (although we exclude the trivial case of perfect correlation
that occurs when δ or ε is zero from the analysis). We do not consider
anti-correlation.
What are the detectives’ payoffs, i.e., the probabilities of ending the game
with a true belief? When neither detective plays Suspend nothing is really
changed, so the payoffs are as in the original version of the peer disagreement
game. The profiles (Stay,Suspend) and (Suspend,Stay) are also unchanged:
as long as there is some probability of the detectives changing their mind
when playing Suspend (i.e., as long as δ > 0 and ε > 0), in these profiles the
detectives eventually agree on whichever opinion the detective playing Stay
started with (with probability one).
For the three remaining profiles, determining the payoffs is a little more
involved. Here we rely on an analysis using (absorbing) Markov Chains. On
any round, the game may be in one of four states: Jane has a true belief
and Hercule has a false belief (state s1), Jane has a false belief and Hercule
has a true belief (s2), Jane and Hercule both have a true belief (s3), or Jane
20Of course, only one of these two latter possibilities will result in a genuinely new belief:
even in the case where she generates a “new” belief there is some chance that this belief
happens to be the same as the one she had on the previous round.
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and Hercule both have false beliefs (s4). States s1 and s2 are transient, while
state s3 and s4 are absorbing: the game ends when an absorbing state is
reached. The probabilities that the game is in one of these states in the first
round are given by the (row) vectors vd and va, where
vd =
[ s1 s2
p(1− q) (1− p)q
]
and va =
[ s3 s4
pq (1− p)(1− q)
]
.
Following standard practice for absorbing Markov Chains, we write the
matrix of transition probabilities P as a block matrix:
P =
 Q R
O I
 .
Here, Q is the matrix of transition probabilities between the transient states,
R is the matrix of transition probabilities from the transient states to the
absorbing states, O is the 2×2 zero matrix, and I is the 2×2 identity matrix
(because there are no transitions out of absorbing states).
If both detectives play Suspend, the transition probabilities from the
transient states are as follows:
Q =

s1 s2
s1 (1− δ(1− p))(1− εq) δ(1− p)εq
s2 δpε(1− q) (1− δp)(1− ε(1− q))
,
R =

s3 s4
s1 (1− δ(1− p))εq δ(1− p)(1− εq)
s2 δp(1− ε(1− q)) (1− δp)ε(1− q)
.
For example, the transition probability from s1 to s2 is the probability that
Jane moves from a true to a false belief, which is δ(1−p), times the probability
that Hercule moves from a false to a true belief, which is εq.
Now the probabilities of ending the game in each of the absorbing states
s3 and s4 are given in a row vector w, where
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w = vd
( ∞∑
k=0
Qk
)
R + va = vd (I −Q)−1R + va.
The first entry of w is the probability of ending the game in the absorbing
state where both detectives have a true belief, and the second entry is the
probability of both detectives ending up with a false belief.21 Hence the
(expected) payoff to Jane and Hercule on the profile (Suspend,Suspend) is
w1 =
pq (δε+ δ2(1− ε)(1− p) + (1− δ)ε2(1− q))
δε (pq + (1− p)(1− q)) + δ2(1− ε)p(1− p) + (1− δ)ε2q(1− q) . (1)
We can perform the same analysis for the profile (Suspend,Switch). The
only difference is in the matrices of transition probabilities Q and R. When
Hercule plays Switch, he switches back and forth between a true and a false
belief on any round in which the game remains in a transient state (once the
detectives agree—i.e., an absorbing state is reached—he stops switching).
Hence
Q =

s1 s2
s1 0 δ(1− p)
s2 δp 0
 and R =

s3 s4
s1 1− δ(1− p) 0
s2 0 1− δp
.
Using the same formula for w, we find that the payoff to Jane and Hercule
on the profile (Suspend,Switch) is
w1 = p
1 + δ(1− p)(2q − δq − 1)
1− δp(1− p) . (2)
By symmetry, the payoff on the profile (Switch,Suspend) is
q
1 + ε(2p− εp− 1)(1− q)
1− εq(1− q) . (3)
21When at least one detective plays Suspend and δ > 0 and ε > 0, the detectives
eventually end up agreeing with probability one. As a result, the two entries of w sum to
one.
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Hence the full table of expected utilities is as given in table 2. Note that if
δ = ε = 1 we are back in the case we started with, where new beliefs are
generated independently of those generated in previous rounds. The above
derivation thus also serves as a proof of the values given in table 1.
Stay Suspend Switch
Stay (p, q) p p
Suspend q (1) (2)
Switch q (3) pq
Table 2: Expected utilities in the peer disagreement game with correlated
beliefs.
A.2 Results and Discussion
What are the Nash equilibria of this generalized version of the peer disagree-
ment game? This depends on the values of p and q (as before) but also on
the values of δ and ε. Suppose, for instance, that δ = ε = 1/4, i.e., in case
the two detectives disagree and one of them plays Suspend, she copies her
reasoning from the previous round three quarters of the time, generating a
new belief in accordance with her truth-sensitivity only one quarter of the
time. The Nash equilibria of this game are as shown in figure 2.
The results are qualitatively quite similar to those in the original peer
disagreement game. In particular, (Stay,Stay) is an equilibrium if and only
if p = q, and (Suspend,Suspend) is an equilibrium in the top-right corner of
the figure. The case where (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) are equilibria
simultaneously occurs whenever p = q ≥ 0.57. Figure 2 only shows the case
where δ = ε = 1/4, but to a large extent these features generalize to all
possible values of δ and ε, as the following propositions show.
Proposition 1. In the peer disagreement game with correlated beliefs, (Stay,Stay)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if p = q.
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(Su,Sw)
(Sw,Su)
(Su,Sw) & (Sw,Su)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Stay)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Suspend)
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Suspend,Switch)
(Suspend,Suspend)
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Stay,Switch)
(Stay,Stay)
1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
Figure 2: Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game with correlated
belief (δ = ε = 1/4) as a function of p and q.
Proposition 2. In the peer disagreement game with correlated beliefs, if
p = q ≥ 0.63 and δ = ε then (Suspend,Suspend) is a Nash equilibrium.
Recall from figure 1 that at least one of (Suspend,Suspend), (Suspend,Switch),
and (Switch,Suspend) was a Nash equilibrium if and only if p + q ≥ 1. Ar-
guably, all three of these profiles reflect a version of the Conciliatory View
(after all, they call on both detectives to revise their view in light of the
disagreement). While the region where (Suspend,Suspend) is an equilibrium
is quite sensitive to variations in the values of δ and ε, this is only due to
competition from these other two “Conciliatory” profiles. The region where
at least one of these three Conciliatory profiles is a Nash equilibrium turns
out to be robust to the introduction of correlated beliefs.
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Proposition 3. In the peer disagreement game with correlated belief, if p+
q ≥ 1 then at least one of the Conciliatory profiles is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4. In the peer disagreement game with correlated belief, if p =
q > 1/2 then both detectives have a higher probability of ending the game
with a true belief under any of the three Conciliatory profiles than under
(Stay,Stay).
So in the game with correlated beliefs we can reproduce all the important
features of the game in the main text: (1) (Stay,Stay) is only an equilib-
rium if p = q, (2) Conciliatory and Steadfast profiles can be Nash equilibria
simultaneously, (3) Conciliatory equilibria are more robust to uncertainty
about truth-sensitivity, (4) when there are both Conciliatory and Steadfast
equilibria, Conciliatory equilibria are preferable by the detectives’ own lights.
We conclude that introducing correlations between the detectives’ beliefs
on different rounds does not have a strong influence on the results. In partic-
ular, all of the qualitative conclusions we drew about the peer disagreement
game in section 5 remain valid when such correlations are introduced.
B A Model With Only One Round
B.1 The Model
Another potentially problematic assumption of our model is its iterative na-
ture. In particular, objections have been raised against the assumption that
the strategy Suspend involves, among other things, gathering new evidence
(reflected by a new independent draw from the probability distribution by
which initial beliefs were generated). This may be thought of as being against
the spirit of the peer disagreement debate.
In this appendix we will consider two versions of the model that respec-
tively weaken and completely remove that assumption. The first model moves
from an iterative model to a model with only one round, but keeps the as-
sumption that if the detectives Suspend on that one round, they gather new
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evidence to form their final belief. The second model also has only one round,
but now the gathering of new evidence is removed in favor of the possibility
of ending the game in a suspended state.
How are the probabilities of ending the game with a true belief affected
by changing the model to have only one round? Details are given in table 3.
Since in a one round game only the detective’s own strategy matters, this
table just gives Jane and Hercule’s payoff as a function of their own strategy.
Stay Suspend Switch
Jane p pq + p(p(1− q) + (1− p)q) q
Hercule q pq + q(p(1− q) + (1− p)q) p
Table 3: Expected utilities associated with each strategy if there is only one
round.
The probabilities in table 3 are obtained as follows. If the detective plays
Stay, the probability of ending the game with a true belief is the probability
of generating a true belief at the start of the first round (p for Jane, q for
Hercule). If the detective plays Switch, at the end of the first round she
always has the belief the other detective started with, so the probability of
ending the game with a true belief is the probability that the other detec-
tive got it right initially (q for Jane, p for Hercule). If the detective plays
Suspend, there are two ways to end the game with a true belief. Either they
immediately agree on the correct truth-value (this happens with probabil-
ity pq) or they disagree (probability p(1 − q) + (1 − p)q) but the detective
suspends and the new belief she generates is correct.
Now consider a model in which, as above, there is only one round of the
game, but if a detective suspends she does not generate a new belief. The
question is how ending the game in a state of suspension should be evaluated.
We introduce a new parameter us to capture this value. It seems clear that
being in suspension is worse than having a true belief but better than having
a false belief, which implies that 0 < us < 1. The most reasonable value of
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us is perhaps 1/2 but we will not assume this.
Stay Suspend Switch
Jane p pq + us(p(1− q) + (1− p)q) q
Hercule q pq + us(p(1− q) + (1− p)q) p
Table 4: Expected utilities associated with each strategy if no new evidence
is gathered.
Payoffs to the two detectives are given in table 4. The only change com-
pared to table 3 is that if a detective plays Suspend and the detectives dis-
agree (with probability p(1− q) + (1− p)q) she gets a payoff of us (the value
of ending the game in suspension) rather than p or q (the probability that
she would obtain a true belief if allowed to gather new evidence).
B.2 Results and Discussion
What are the Nash equilibria of the version of the peer disagreement game
with only one round whose payoffs are given in table 3, i.e., the version in
which the detectives gather new evidence if they suspend judgment (so the
value of suspending is irrelevant)? As before, it depends on the values of p
and q, as shown in figure 3.
The results are similar to those obtained before. The two main differences
are that (1) Suspend is no longer a good strategy outside of the top-right
corner and that (2) the profile (Stay,Stay) no longer appears as a Nash
equilibrium in the top-right corner, even when p = q.
Particularly noteworthy is that (Suspend,Suspend) remains a Nash equi-
librium in the situations most directly relevant to the peer disagreement
debate: when p and q are both greater than 1/2 and relatively close to each
other. Hence we take our results here to favor the Conciliatory View slightly
more than the results obtained in the main text.
What if no new evidence is gathered, i.e., payoffs are as in table 4? Then
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(Suspend,Suspend)
(Switch,Suspend)
(Suspend,Switch)
(Switch,Stay)
(Stay,Switch)
0
1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
Figure 3: Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game with only one round.
the Nash equilibria of the game depend on the value us of being in a state
of suspension, in addition to the values of p and q. This is illustrated for a
number of values of us in figure 4.
If us < 1/2, it is never a good idea to suspend judgment: at least one of
the alternative strategies Stay and Switch always leads to a better payoff. If
us = 1/2, the three strategies Stay, Suspend, and Switch pay off equally well
whenever p = q, so in that case any of the nine strategy profiles, including
(Suspend,Suspend), is a Nash equilibrium on the line through the middle of
figure 4 (top-left). If us > 1/2, Suspend is the unique best strategy whenever
p and q are relatively close to each other in value (where what it means to
be “close” is stricter when us is closer to 1/2 and looser when us is closer
to 1). Accordingly, as us increases, we see a growing area in the middle of
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Figure 4: Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game when us ≤ 12 (top-
left), when us = 58 (top-right), when us =
3
4 (bottom-left), and when us =
7
8
(bottom-right).
the figures where (Suspend,Suspend) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Unlike either the original iterative model or the version of the one round
model considered above, the area where (Suspend,Suspend) is an equilibrium
is not confined to the upper right corner of the graph.
How do these results relate to the peer disagreement debate? Regarding
the first one-round model, whereby the agents are allowed to re-examine the
evidence, we can see that the Steadfast strategy becomes less rewarding.
The strategy Stay no longer appears in the top-right corner of figure 3,
which is the area that is interesting for the debate about peer disagreement.
This means that, when the detectives are peers in that they have comparably
good track-records, the Steadfast strategy Stay is always outclassed by other
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strategies, most importantly by the Conciliatory profile (Suspend,Suspend).
Next, consider the second one-round model, whereby the agents do not
go back to the evidence to form a new opinion. Again we look at the more
interesting top-right corners in figure 4. Somewhat unsurprisingly, we can see
that which strategy is best depends on the value that is assigned to suspension
of judgment. The more valuable this is considered to be, the more rewarding
a Conciliatory strategy becomes, and the less valuable suspending is, the
more a Steadfast strategy comes into play again.
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